TRANSPARENCY POLICIES

10. Disclosing Terrorism Threats to Improve Public Safety

Example: Terror Threat Alert Rating

Six months after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration created a color-coded ranking system to inform the public about terrorist threats. The system’s stated purpose was “to provide a comprehensive and effective means of disseminating information regarding the risk of terrorist acts to Federal, State, and local authorities and to the American people” in order “to inform and facilitate decisions appropriate to different levels of government and to private citizens at home and at work.” The aim was to minimize attacks and their consequences. The system was designed to be flexible and information-based. It provided a framework for communicating the severity of national, local, or sector-specific threats as well as their likely character and timing.116 The alert system established five color-coded levels of terrorist threat: green = low; blue = guarded; yellow = elevated; orange = high; red = severe. The presidential directive clearly contemplated that alerts would be accompanied by factual information.117 The directive also made it clear that information was intended to create incentives for action. Each level of alert was meant to trigger threat-specific protective measures by government agencies, private organizations, and individuals. The directive provided that threat levels would reflect both the probability and the gravity of attack and would be reviewed at regular intervals to see if they should be adjusted. The level set was to be based on the degree to which a threat was credible, corroborated, imminent, and grave.118

The system provided flexibility. Threat levels could be set for specific geographical areas or for specific industries or facilities. The system provided for case-by-case judgments about whether threat levels would be announced publicly or communicated in a more limited way to emergency officials and other selected audiences. The stated intent was to “share as much information regarding the threat as possible, consistent with the safety of the Nation.”119

Once the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in March 2003, the secretary of homeland security was charged with responsibility for setting threat levels, with the advice of the Homeland Security Council.120 Within the department, the warning system was administered by an undersecretary for information analysis and infrastructure protection.

As of early 2006, the terrorist threat warning level had been raised and lowered seven times, each time fromyellow(elevated) to orange (high) and back again. The system generally produced warnings that proved too vague to provide government officials, business managers, or ordinary citizens with incentives to take appropriate protective actions. However, alerts were increasingly specific. On August 2, 2004, the Department of Homeland Security issued a warning concerning three particular facilities: the Prudential building in Newark, New Jersey, and the headquarters of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in Washington, D.C. On July 7, 2005, when several bombs were detonated in the London subway system, DHS raised the threat level from yellow to orange for mass transit only, though noting that the government had “no specific, credible information” to suggest that an attack in the United States was imminent.121

The system worked differently for different audiences. When a decision was made to change the threat level, department officials notified federal, state, and local agencies electronically or by phone and also called chief executives of major corporations, using a secure connection maintained by the Business Roundtable.122

DHS also developed channels for communicating threat information without raising the overall threat level. The department issued threat advisories or less urgent information bulletins for specific locales or sectors. Access to these communications was often restricted, however, leaving the public uninformed. Officials explained that such information was shared on a need-to-know basis, since it was often derived from classified sources. A GAO review of a sample of secret threat advisories in 2004 concluded that they contained “actionable information about threats targeting critical national networks, infrastructures, or key assets such as transit systems.”123

In practice, however, the terrorist threat warning system remained problematic. Several in-depth evaluations and surveys found that rankings were little used by its intended audiences. The Gilmore Commission, a broad-based congressional commission charged with continuing oversight of domestic responses to terrorism, concluded in 2003 that “[t]he Homeland SecurityWarning System has become largely marginalized.” On occasion, governors and mayors declined to elevate threat levels or take other federally recommended actions. Public and private groups expressed frustration at the lack of information about the character and location of threats. The commission recommended the creation of a regional alert system featuring specific guidance, as well as training local officials for responses to each threat level.124

A report by the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service in 2003 concluded that threat alerts were so vague that the public “might begin to question the authenticity” of threats and therefore ignore them. The report noted that the government “has never explained the sources and quality of the intelligence upon which the threat levels were based.”125

Government officials have rarely received information specific enough to act upon. A survey by the General Accounting Office in 2004 found that sixteen of twenty-four federal agencies had received information about elevated threat levels from the media before they received it from homeland security officials.126 One of the potential strengths of the alert system was that it was constructed to work synergistically with regulatory requirements. Each federal department was required to come up with its own protective measures appropriate to each threat level and to take those actions each time the threat level was raised. However, federal agencies surveyed by the GAO reported that changes from yellow to orange had minimal impact on their practices, since they maintained high levels of security at all times.127

State officials, too, reported that they received much of their information about changed threat levels through the media and got little specific information from the government. The GAO survey found that fifteen of forty states learned about threat level changes from the media before they heard from federal officials in at least one instance. State and local officials reported that learning about threats at the same time as the public could carry heavy political costs. State officials also noted that they received conflicting advice from different federal authorities about what actions to take.128

The most serious failing of the transparency system has been its lack of meaningful information and guidance. Local officials, always on the front lines in preparing for and responding to disasters, need accurate, specific, and timely information. A report by the minority staff of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee concluded in 2003 that two years after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, state and local officials had too little information to respond to terrorist attacks. The report noted that effective communication channels still had not been established with state and local officials, so states and localities had no effective way of communicating with one another or of learning fromthe successes ormistakes of others.129 A June 2004 report by the nonpartisan GAO echoed these themes. It suggested that warnings would be more effective if theyweremore specific and action-oriented; communicated throughmultiple methods; included timely notification; and featured specific information on the nature, location, and timing of threats as well as guidance on actions to take in response to threats.130

The public remained confused. Information accompanying increases in the threat level often has been vague or irrelevant to the daily activities of most Americans. Most state governments and many local governments have developed their own alert systems which are not necessarily consistent with the federal system. The administration has also sent mixed messages to the public concerning what actions to take. In raising the threat level to orange on September 10, 2002, for example, Secretary Ridge told people to “continue with your plans” but “be wary and be mindful.”131 In June 2003, Ridge acknowledged that the system needed improvement. “We worry about the credibility of the system...we want to continue to refine it, because we understand it has caused a kind of anxiety.”132

Members of Congress from both parties expressed growing impatience with vague and conflicting messages. After the government raised the threat level to orange over the 2003 Christmas holidays and told citizens to be vigilant but continue their daily routines, Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) asked: “Why would the department tell people to do everything they would normally do?...We’re at high risk.” Christopher Cox (RCalif.), chairmanof theHouse SelectCommittee onHomeland Security, noted that vague warnings could also cause too much action, citing evidence that groups had canceled field trips and other activities.133 Senator Frank R. Lautenberg (D-N.J.) noted that “the system may be doing more harm than good.”134

Public confusion was reflected in polls. A Hart-Teeter poll sponsored by the Council for Excellence in Government inMarch 2004 found that 73 percent of those polled were anxious or concerned about terrorismand 34 percent had looked for information about what to do in the event of an attack, but only one person in five was aware of state or local preparedness plans.135 Earlier Fox News polls found that 78 percent of those responding did not know or said they were not sure what the current threat level was and that 90 percent responded to recent elevation of the threat level by going about their lives as usual.136 A New York Times poll in October 2004 found that nearly two-thirds of those responding did not have emergency kits prepared and more than two-thirds did not have communication plans.

Philip Zimbardo, the president of the American Psychological Association, suggested that the terrorist threat system had turned the United States into a nation of “worriers, not warriors,” by “forcing citizens to ride an emotional roller coaster without providing any clear instructions on how to soothe their jitters.” He noted that a large body of research suggested that effective safety measures required a credible source, information about the particular event that created a threat, and information about specific actions citizens could take to reduce risks.137

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FOOTNOTES
116. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3 (HSPD-3), March 12, 2002, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-3.htm, as amended by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), February 28, 2003, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html and http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4331 (sites accessed May 22, 2006).
117. Remarks by Governor Ridge at Announcement of Homeland Security Advisory System,March 12, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020312-11.html (site accessed May 22, 2006).
118. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–296, Title II, Subtitle A, §201(d)(7), 116 Stat. 2135, 2146 (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§101 et seq. (Supp. III 2003).
119. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3 (HSPD-3), March 12, 2002.
120. Pub. L. 107–296, Title II, Subtitle A, Section 201(d)(7).
121. Alerts are summarized at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial0844.xml.
122. Congressional Research Service, 2003, pp. 1–4.
123. General Accounting Office, 2004, p. 13. 124. Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2003.
125. Congressional Research Service, 2003, pp. 4–5.
126. General Accounting Office, 2004, pp. 4–5 and 12–14.
127. General Accounting Office, 2004, p. 18.
128. General Accounting Office, 2004, p. 18.
129. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 2003.
130. General Accounting Office, 2004, p. 13.
131. Attorney General Ashcroft, Director RidgeDiscuss Threat Level, September 10, 2002 (White House transcript).
132. Philip Shenon,”Threats and Responses: Domestic Security,” New York Times, June 6, 2003, p. A15.
133. “Analysis: Congressional Hearings on Terror Alert System,” Morning Edition (National Public Radio), broadcast February 5, 2004.
134. Philip Shenon, “Report Finds Threat Alerts in Color Code Baffle Public,” New York Times, August 10, 2003, p. A18.
135. Council for Excellence inGovernment, fromtheHome Front to the Front Lines: America Speaks Out about Homeland Security (a Hart-Teeter poll, March 2004).
136. Fox News polls, July 2002 and February 2003.
137. Philip Zimbardo, “Phantom Menace,” Psychology Today, June 2003, pp. 34–36.
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